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In November 2006, William Miller was sentenced to ten years in 
prison for bank robbery.
1
 Thirteen months later, he began to serve his 
sentence at the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana.
2
 
During the time between his sentencing and starting his sentence, 
Miller was diagnosed with a thalamic brain tumor that caused reduced 
sensation in the left side of his body.
3
 Because of this tumor, the 
prison’s medical staff gave Miller a lower-bunk restriction because it 
was unsafe for him to be in an upper-bunk.
4
 Two years later, Miller 
was reassigned to a “special housing unit,” where he was assigned to 
an upper-bunk despite repeatedly requesting a lower-bunk from the 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology.  
1
 Estate of Miller v. Marberry, 847 F.3d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 2017). 
2
 Id.  
3
 Id. at 427. 
4
 Id.  
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prison guards and to the prison’s warden.
5
 Miller fell from his assigned 
upper-bunk several times, and one of these falls fractured Miller’s 
back.
6
 Miller brought a civil suit against Gary Rogers, a prison guard, 
and Helen Marberry, the Warden of the prison.
7
 Miller alleged that 
Rogers and Marberry acted with deliberate indifference to his serious 
medical condition in violation of his Eighth Amendment
8
 right to be 
free from cruel and unusual punishments.
9
 
The district court construed his complaint as an action falling 
under the purview of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, the 1971 United States Supreme Court case that 
first established a private cause of action for damages against federal 
officials for violating constitutional rights.
 10
 The district court granted 
a motion for summary judgment in favor of Rogers and Marberry for 
two reasons: first, neither Rogers nor Marberry were responsible for 
bunk assignments; and, second, if Rogers had checked the prison’s 
electronic database, he would not have found a lower-bunk 
restriction.
11
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that Miller did not 
seek relief from the correct parties because neither of the defendants 
were responsible for bunk assignments or deciding who had a medical 
need for a lower-bunk.
12
 
By affirming the lower court, the Seventh Circuit made several 
critical errors. First, the court ignored precedent establishing that 
deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition can violate the 
Eighth Amendment. Second, the court overextended the holding in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
13
 to absolve the defendants of liability. Third, the 
                                                 
5






 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII  
9
 Estate of Miller, 847 F.3d at 431. 
10
 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
11
 Estate of Miller, 847 F.3d at 427. 
12
 Id. at 426. 
13
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). 
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court ignored genuine disputes of material fact and improperly 
affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
defendants. The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Estate of Miller v. 
Marberry will ultimately release federal officials from liability for 
violating constitutional rights and will limit the remedies for prisoners 
whose constitutional rights are violated. 
 
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 
 
The 42nd Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which created a 
cause of action for damages under the Fourteenth Amendment against 
state officials for constitutional violations.
14
 However, 42 U.S.C. 
§1983 did not provide for a cause of action against federal officials for 
constitutional violations. This meant that there was no remedy for 
individuals whose constitutional rights had been violated by a federal 
official. The United States Supreme Court took on the job of creating a 
private cause of action for individuals whose constitutional rights are 
violated by federal officials in a case called Bivens v. Six Unknown 




A.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents – Creating A Private Cause 
of Action Against Federal Officials 
 
On November 26, 1965, six agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics entered the apartment of Webster Bivens without a search or 
arrest warrant.
16
 The agents searched the apartment from top to 
bottom.
17
 After the warrantless search of his apartment, Bivens was 
arrested for allegedly violating federal narcotics laws and was 
handcuffed and detained in front of his wife and children.
18
 Bivens 
                                                 
14
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West, Westlaw Next, through Pub.L. 104-317). 
15
 403 U.S. 338 (1971). 
16




 Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics (Bivens II), 409 
F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 1969). 
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was then taken to the Federal Narcotics Bureau where he was 
interrogated, photographed, fingerprinted, strip-searched, and 
booked.
19
 A United States Commissioner eventually dismissed Bivens’ 
narcotics charges, but he still suffered “great humiliation, 
embarrassment, and mental suffering” because of the warrantless 
search and subsequent arrest.
20
 
After his release, Bivens sued the six federal agents in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
21
 He sought 
$15,000 in damages from each of the six agents  for violating his 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.
22
 The district court dismissed the complaint claiming the 
court lacked jurisdiction, or in the alternative, claiming that Bivens 
had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
23
 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that the district court did have proper jurisdiction, but still 
affirmed the lower court’s decision on the basis that Bivens’s claim 
failed to state a cause of action.
24
 The court hinged its decision on the 
fact that there was no established remedy for individuals whose rights 
had been violated by federal officials.
25
 The court reasoned that policy 
decisions concerning the enforcement of a federal right should be left 
to Congress.
26
 Thus, in the absence of an explicit congressional 
authorization for damages against federal officials, Bivens could not 
state a claim for which relief could be granted.
27
 Under the Second 
Circuit’s analysis, Bivens could only recover damages in an action 
between private citizens under state law.
28
 




 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. 
21
 Bivens II, 409 F.2d at 719. 
22
 Id. at 719. 
23
 Id. at 719–20. 
24
 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390. 
25
 Bivens II, 409 F.2d at 719.  
26




 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392. 
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
Second Circuit.
29
 The Court emphasized the differences in a 
relationship between two private citizens and a relationship between a 
private citizen and a federal agent.
30
 The Court reasoned that “[a]n 
agent acting—albeit unconstitutionally—in the name of the United 
States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual 
trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.”
31
 Further, the 
Court pointed out that its “cases make clear the Fourth Amendment 
operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power” and 
“guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of 
federal authority.”
32
 The Court did not concern itself with the absence 
of an express authorization from Congress for damages as a remedy 
because “where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has 
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their 
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief,”
33
 and “[h]istorically, 
damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of 
personal interests in liberty.”
34
 This was the first time the Supreme 
Court recognized a private cause of action for damages against federal 
agents for constitutional violations.  
Even though the Court approved money damages against federal 
agents as an appropriate remedy, the holding in Bivens was 
deliberately narrow.
35
 The Court urged future courts to be wary of 
permitting an action for damages in the absence of Congressional 
approval unless there were no “special factors counselling 
hesitation.”
36
 Moreover, the Court did not create a damages remedy 
for any and all constitutional violations. The Court specified that this 
                                                 
29
 Id. at 390. 
30
 Id. at 391–92. 
31




 Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
34
 Id. at 395. 
35
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B. The Evolution of Bivens 
 
Bivens established that when federal officials violate the Fourth 
Amendment, money damages are an appropriate and acceptable 
remedy.
38
 However, Bivens gave no guidance on what to do for 
constitutional violations outside of the Fourth Amendment. Since 
1971, the Court has reexamined the Bivens action several times.  
 
1.  Expanding Bivens. 
 
In Bivens, the Supreme Court specified that its holding extended 
only to violations of the Fourth Amendment. However, there are many 
other ways to violate an individual’s constitutional rights. It was 
inevitable that once the Court opened the door for lawsuits against 
federal officials for violating an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights, litigants would begin to bring lawsuits when federal officials 
violated other constitutional rights as well. 
 
a. Davis v. Passman – The Fifth Amendment 
 
Eight years after Bivens was decided, the Supreme Court 





 the Court confronted the issue of whether a cause 
of action and a damages remedy could be implied under the 
Constitution when the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is 






 The Supreme Court addressed the Bivens issue in several cases during these 
eight years, but none of these decisions impacted the scope of Bivens. See, e.g., 
Butz v. Economou, 437 U.S. 478 (1978) (addressing whether qualified 
immunity trumps a Bivens action). 
40
 Davis v. Passman (Davis I), 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
6
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 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, 
determined that “no civil action for damages” could be implied.
42
 
However, the Supreme Court disagreed.
43
 
The plaintiff in Davis was a female employed as a deputy 
administrative assistant for a United States Congressman. About six 
months after the plaintiff began working for the congressman, the 
congressman terminated her employment.
44
 The congressman wrote 
her a note that said she was “able, energetic and a very hard worker,” 
but he had decided “that it was essential that the understudy to [his] 
Administrative Assistant be a man.”
45
 
The plaintiff alleged that her boss discriminated against her “on 
the basis of sex in violation of the United States Constitution and the 
Fifth Amendment thereto.”
46
 The plaintiff sought damages in the form 
of back pay,
47
 and reinstatement to her position with a promotion and 
salary increase.
48
 However, the matter was complicated by two things. 
First, the congressman argued that he was immune from liability for 
damages under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
49
 And second, the 
congressman had lost his re-election and was no longer in office.
50
 
Therefore, there was no longer the possibility of relief by reinstate, 
promotion, and a salary increase.
51
 
The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim on 
which relief could be granted because “the law afford[ed] no private 
right of action” for her claim.
52
 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the 
                                                 
41
 Id. at 229. 
42
 Davis v. Passman (Davis II), 571 F.2d 793, 801 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). 
43






 Id. at 230–31 
47
 Id. at 231. 
48
 Id. n.4. 
49
 Id. at 231 n.5. 
50
 Id. at 230 n.1, 245. 
51
 Id. at 245.   
52
 Id. at 230. 
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Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, but the panel’s decision was 
reversed by an en banc decision of the Fifth Circuit.
53
  
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision 
for four reasons. First, damages were the appropriate remedy in this 
case: the plaintiff could not be reinstated at her job because the 
congressman was no longer in office and no longer had a 
congressional staff. Because “it [was] damages or nothing” for the 
plaintiff, the Court held that damages were appropriate.
54
 Second, even 
though allowing a lawsuit against a congressman for actions taken in 
the course of his official conduct raised special concerns counseling 
hesitation, the concerns were alleviated by the protections afforded to 
congressmen by the Speech and Debate Clause.
55
 Because the 
congressman’s actions were not shielded by the Speech and Debate 
Clause, the Court applied the principle that “legislators ought . . . 
generally be bound by [the law] as are ordinary persons.”
56
 Third, 
there had been ‘‘no explicit congressional declaration that persons’ in 
petitioner’s position injured by unconstitutional federal employment 
discrimination ‘may not recover money damages from’ those 
responsible for the injury.”
57
 Finally, the Court was not concerned with 
flooding federal courts with claims because a similar remedy was 
already available for similar injuries when they occurred under state 
law by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
58
 The Court concluded that the 
petitioner had a cause of action under the Fifth Amendment, and the 
appropriate remedy would be damages if the petitioner prevailed on 









 Id. at 246 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410). 
55




 Davis I, 442 U.S. at 246–47 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397).  
58
 Id. at 248.  
59
 Id. at 248–49. 
8
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/4




b. Carlson v. Green – The Eighth Amendment 
 
In 1980, the Supreme Court considered expanding Bivens once 
again, this time for a violation of Eighth Amendment rights. The 
action was brought by a mother on behalf of her deceased son. She 
alleged that her son was injured and died because federal prison 




The Court reiterated that Bivens established damages as the 
appropriate remedy when federal officials violate an individual’s 
constitutional rights.
61
 The Court gave two specific situations in which 
Bivens actions for constitutional violations may be defeated. First, if 
the defendants demonstrate “special factors counselling hesitation in 
the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”
62
 Or second, if the 
defendants show Congress has provided an equally effective 
alternative remedy and has explicitly declared it to be a substitute for 
recovery under the Constitution.
63
   
The Court found no “special factors counseling hesitation” 
because the prison officials were not exempt from judicially created 
remedies, and they were adequately protected by the qualified 
immunity afforded to them under Butz v. Economou,
64
 which states, 
“Federal officials will not be liable for mere mistakes in judgment, 
whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law.”
65
 
 Similarly, there was no congressional declaration substituting 
another form of recovery for violations of the Eighth Amendment.
66
  
The prison officials argued that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 
acted as the necessary substitution, but the Court disagreed. The Court 
pointed to congressional commentary to support its assertion that 
                                                 
60
 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). 
61
 Id. at 19. 
62
 Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396). 
63
 Id. at 18–19. 
64
 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
65
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FTCA was not meant to be a substitute for a Bivens action, but was a 
parallel and complementary cause of action.
67
 
The Court pointed to four additional factors that suggested Bivens 
was an effective remedy for violations of the Eighth Amendment, and 
to support its conclusion that Congress did not intend for FTCA to be 
an exclusive substitute remedy. First, the Bivens remedy would 
compensate the victim and act as a deterrent because it is recoverable 
against individuals.
68
 Second, the Court’s previous decisions indicated 
that punitive damages could be awarded in a Bivens suit.
69
 Punitive 
damages were particularly appropriate where they would be available 
in a comparable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a state official, and 
the ‘‘‘constitutional design’ would be stood on its head if federal 
officials did not face at least the same liability as state officials guilty 
of the same constitutional transgression.”
70
 Third, there is the option 
for a jury in a Bivens action.
71
 Fourth, the liability of federal officials 
who violate citizens’ constitutional rights should be subject to uniform 
rules.
72
 The Court held that in the absence of an explicit congressional 
mandate, the FTCA was an exclusive remedy, and the FTCA did not 
sufficiently protect citizens’ rights.
73
  
Ultimately, the Court extended a private cause of action under 
Bivens against federal officials who violate a person’s Eighth 
Amendment Constitutional rights. 
 
2. Refining Bivens 
 
After Bivens, Davis, and Carlson, federal courts recognized non-
statutory causes of action against federal officials for violating an 
individual’s Fourth, Fifth, or Eighth Amendment rights. If a plaintiff 




 Id. at 21. 
69
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could show that there were no special factors counseling hesitation, 
and that Congress had not expressly declared a new cause of action as 
an equally remedial substitute for Bivens, a Bivens action was 
appropriate.  
The Court then veered from its pattern of expanding Bivens, and 
began to refine the cause of action until it developed into what it is 
today. After Carlson, the Court examined who could be a proper 
defendant in a Bivens action, and when a Bivens action was 
unavailable. 
 
a. Bush v. Lucas – The First Amendment  
 
In 1983, the Supreme Court once again considered expanding the 
scope of Bivens. This time, the Court was asked to authorize a non-
statutory damages remedy under Bivens for a federal employee whose 
First Amendment rights were violated by his superiors.
74
 The 
petitioner was an aerospace engineer employed at a facility run by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
75
 The facility where 
the petitioner worked underwent a series of reorganizations, which 
caused him to be reassigned to new positions twice.
76
 He appealed 
both reassignments, and, while the appeals were pending, he gave two 
public interviews and made several public comments condemning the 
facility for fraudulent and wasteful use of taxpayers’ money.
77
 
The respondent, the director of the facility, commenced an 
adverse personnel action charging the petitioner with publicly making 
misleading and false statements that demonstrated a malicious attitude 
towards management and all personnel of the facility, thus stunting 
efficiency and negatively affecting public confidence in the 
government and its services.
78
 The respondent determined that 
although the petitioner’s conduct could justify termination, demotion 
                                                 
74
 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983).  
75






 Id. at 369–70. 
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was the appropriate consequence for a first offense.
79
 The petitioner 
appealed to the Federal Employee Appeals Authority, and the 
Authority concluded that the demotion was justified.
80
 
Two years later, the Civil Service Commission’s Appeals Review 
board reopened the petitioner’s proceedings and recommended that he 
be restored to his former position with backpay because his statements 
were not “wholly without truth” and did not “justify abrogation of the 
exercise of free speech.”
81
 While this appeal was pending, the 
petitioner filed an action against the respondent seeking to recover 
damages for defamation and violation of his First Amendment free 
speech rights.
82
 The district court granted the respondent’s motion for 
summary judgment and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding the 
“plaintiff had no cause of action for damages under the First 
Amendment for retaliatory demotion in view of the available remedies 
under the Civil Service Commission Regulations.”
83
 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit and declined to 
expand the Bivens action to this new scenario.
84
 The Court pointed to 
Congress’ step by step development of the Civil Service Commission 
Regulations and its elaborate remedial system as a reason not to create 
a new judicial remedy.
85
 Similarly, subjecting management personnel  
to personal liability for employment decisions they believed to be a 
proper response to improper criticism of an agency would deter 
management from imposing necessary discipline in future cases.
86
 
Finally, the Court pointed to Congress’ ability to accurately assess the 
need for a new remedy and to create a statutory remedy as a reason not 
to create a judicial remedy.
87
 
                                                 
79




 Id. at 372. 
82
 Id. at 372.  
83
 Bush v. Lucas (Bush II), 647 F.2d 573, 574 (4th Cir. 1981). 
84
 Bush, 462 U.S. at 390. 
85
 Id. at 388. 
86
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b. FDIC v. Meyer – Agents, Not Agencies 
 
In 1994, the Supreme Court was asked to extend a cause of action 
under Bivens against an agency of the Federal Government.
88
 FDIC v. 
Meyer
89
 involved a man who sued the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation for depriving him of a property interest without 
due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
90
  
The Court refused to extend a Bivens action against a federal agency 
for two reasons. First, creating a direct cause of action for damages 
against federal agencies could potentially subject the Federal 
Government to enormous financial burdens.
91
 Second, the Court was 
concerned that if claimants were permitted to bring an action directly 
against a federal agency, the aggrieved party would have no reason to 
bring an action for damages against the individual officers who caused 
the harm.
92
 This would effectively eliminate the deterrent effects that 
the Bivens action was intended to promote.
93
 Because the purpose of 
the Bivens action is to deter federal officials from violating 
constitutional rights, the Bivens action is only appropriate against 




ESTATE OF MILLER V. MARBERRY 
 
For reasons not identified within the record, William Miller died 
before his appeal reached the Seventh Circuit.
95
 His estate was 
                                                 
88




 Id. at 474. 
91
 Id. at 486.  
92






 Estate of Miller, 847 F.3d at 426. 
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substituted as the plaintiff in the case.
96
 I will identify the plaintiff by 
Miller’s name for clarity and expediency. 
 
A. Facts of the Case 
 
 The facts presented in the majority opinion are slightly different 
from the facts presented by Judge Posner in his dissenting opinion. 
This statement of facts will attempt to consolidate the facts from both 
opinions. 
In November 2006, William Miller was convicted of bank robbery 
and was sentenced to ten years in prison.
97
 Sometime after his 
sentencing and before and he began serving his sentence, Miller was 
diagnosed with a thalamic brain tumor.
98
  
After being diagnosed with the brain tumor, Miller began serving 
his sentence in the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, 
Indiana (“FCC Terre Haute”).
99
 One month after arriving at FCC Terre 
Haute, Miller’s doctor ordered that he be restricted to a lower-bunk 
because of his thalamic brain tumor.
100
 The tumor caused Miller to 
have impaired feeling in the left side of his body, and his doctor 
thought that a lower-bunk restriction was necessary to ensure his 
safety as a prisoner.
101
 The lower-bunk restriction was supposed to be 
entered into the prison’s computer database system called SENTRY.
102
 
About a year later, Miller was moved from the prison’s general 
population to a more restrictive housing unit called the “Special 
Housing Unit.”
103
 When Miller was first moved to the “Special 
Housing Unit,” he was assigned to a lower-bunk in accordance with 












 Id. at 430. 
102
 Id. at 426. 
103
 Id. at 429. 
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 However, before he was able to spend even 
one night in his assigned lower-bunk, he was reassigned to an upper-
bunk.
105
 Miller told Gary Rogers, the head guard in his new housing 
unit, that he had a lower-bunk restriction because of his brain tumor.
106
 
Rogers told Miller that he would not be reassigned to a lower-bunk, 
and that if he refused to sleep in his assigned upper-bunk he would 
“receive a disciplinary report for refusing a direct order.”
107
  
Five days after Rogers denied Miller’s initial plea for a lower-
bunk, Miller became dizzy while climbing down the ladder from his 
upper-bunk, slipped, and fell.
108
 Miller hit his head on the concrete 
floor and lost consciousness.
109
 Miller was taken to a hospital, treated 
for his injuries, and given a CAT scan.
110
 When Miller returned to the 
prison, he was again assigned to an upper-bunk.
111
 Miller once again 




Around this same time, Helen Marberry, the prison’s warden, had 
an encounter with Miller during one of her weekly walks through the 
special housing unit.
113
 Miller told Marberry about his fall and his 
subsequent trip to the hospital. He then informed Marberry that he had 
improperly been assigned to an upper-bunk, and he asked for her help 
to get him a corrected bunk assignment.
114
 Marberry would not even 
listen to Miller.
115
 According to Miller’s complaint, Marberry “walked 




















 Id. at 430. 
114
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away from [Miller’s] cell door leaving him midspeech.”
116
 Marberry 
ignored Miller’s plea for a bunk reassignment “despite the fact that 
before he entered the Special Housing Unit, Miller had repeatedly 
discussed his brain tumor with [Marberry] on her visits to prisoners 
during their lunch period.”
117
 
In February of 2009, less than six weeks after his first fall, Miller 
once again fell from his upper-bunk, this time in the middle of the 
night.
118
 Miller severely compacted a segment of his cervical spine 
and fractured his thoracic spine.
119
 Miller, with a broken back, 
remained lying on the floor for over an hour before any member of the 
prison staff noticed that he was injured.
120
 Miller was taken to the 




When Miller returned to the prison from the hospital, he again 
asked for a lower-bunk assignment, and his request was again denied 
with no reason given.
122
 Warden Marberry continued to have weekly 
walks through the “Special Housing Unit,” and each time she 
approached Miller’s cell, she would see him on his assigned upper-
bunk wearing his clamshell back brace and a cervical neck brace.
123
 
Every time she approached Miller’s cell, he asked her to be re-
assigned to a lower-bunk, but his requests went ignored.
124
 The head 
guard, Rogers, also frequently saw Miller wearing multiple body 
braces while sitting on his upper-bunk.
125
 Rogers did nothing in 
response to Miller’s frequent requests that his lower-bunk restriction 
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  Throughout this entire period of time, Miller was in 
acute pain from his severe back injuries.
127
 
Finally, ten months after Miller fractured his back, he was given a 
new lower-bunk restriction.
128
 However, Miller was not immediately 
reassigned to a lower-bunk.
129
 Eleven days after the new restriction 
was given, but before Miller had actually been assigned to a lower-
bunk, a wound on Miller’s back that had been stapled burst open, 
“discharging a large amount of a yellowish fluid consisting mainly of 
blood.”
130
 Miller was taken to a hospital and remained there for four 
months until the wound had finally healed.
131
 After returning to the 




Miller filed an administrative complaint with the prison, but his 
complaint was denied on the grounds that “although he’d had a lower-
bunk restriction since January 29, 2008 –he had never submitted a 
document confirming that restriction to a member of the prison’s staff, 
as required by a notice to the prisoners that ‘It is your responsibility to 
have all medical restrictions on your person to present to staff.’”
133
 
Unfortunately for Miller, even though he had been given a lower-bunk 
restriction, he had lost the document confirming this restriction, and he 
was unable to obtain a new copy.
134
 
Miller’s complaints culminated in a remarkable brush-off from the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons Office of Regional Counsel stating: 
“investigation of your claim did not reveal you suffered any personal 
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injury as a result of the negligent acts or omissions of Bureau of 
Prisons employees acting within the scope of their employment.”
135
  
Miller then filed a claim in The United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Marberry and Rogers 
violated his Eighth Amendment rights.
136
 The district court granted the 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the reasoning that 
neither Marberry nor Rogers were in charge of bunk assignments.
137
 
Further, the court stated that Miller had “not identified a genuine issue 




B. The Seventh Circuit Majority Opinion 
 
In a split panel decision, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision 
of the district court.
139
 Judge Easterbrook and Judge Sykes voted to 




The majority made several critical errors by affirming the decision 
of the district court. First, the majority ignored precedent establishing 
that a prison official’s deliberate indifference to a serious medical 
condition can violate the Eighth Amendment. Second, the majority 
overextended the holding in Ashcroft v. Iqbal
141
 to absolve the 
defendants of liability for their inaction. Third, the majority ignored 
genuine disputes of material fact and improperly affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.  
 
  




 Miller v. Marberry, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10946, at *2 (S.D. Ind. 2015). 
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 Id. at 16. 
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1. The Eighth Amendment Violation 
 
In the eyes of the majority, “Miller’s principal problem [was] the 
identity of the two defendants.”
142
 The majority believed that Miller 
should have sued either the guard responsible for making the bunk 
assignments, or the person in the prison’s medical department 
responsible for deciding who has a medical need for a lower-bunk.
143
 
The majority minimized Miller’s claim by focusing only on the lower-
bunk restriction and its enforcement, without considering the actions, 
or inaction, of Rogers and Marberry. The majority pointed out that 
“the Supreme Court has never held that Bivens actions can be used to 
enforce administrative orders,” nor has it “held that every public 
official has a duty to carry out every other public official’s 
decision.”
144
 The majority then analogized Miller’s case to Town of 
Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
145
 which held that neither prosecutors nor 
police officers are liable for failure to enforce a judicial no-contact 
order,
146
 and questioned why Miller’s lower-bunk restriction should 
receive greater status then a judicial no-contact order.
147
 Unfortunately 
for Miller, this was a gross mischaracterization of his claim.  
The majority stated that for Miller to get anywhere with his claim, 
he had to establish that Rogers and Marberry violated his 
constitutional rights, which Miller did not do.
148
 For Miller to succeed 
with a medical claim under the Eighth Amendment, he needed to 
establish the defendants knew of, or were deliberately indifferent to, 
Miller’s serious medical condition and did not take minimally 
competent steps to deal with that condition.
149
 According to the 
majority, there was no way that Rogers or Marberry could have known 
                                                 
142




 Id. at 427. 
145
 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
146
 Id. at 768. 
147
 Estate of Miller, 847 F.3d at 427. 
148
 Id. at 428. 
149
 Id.  
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about Miller’s serious medical condition.
150
 The majority believed that 
Miller’s statements to Rogers and Marberry about his brain tumor fell 
short of demonstrating a serious medical condition because there are 
many types of brain tumors that have a range of effects, and “benign 
tumors can last decades without causing adverse consequences.”
151
 It 
is true that not all brain tumors constitute a serious medical condition, 
but Miller’s brain tumor actually caused symptoms that made it a 
serious medical condition. The majority seems to overlook that the 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged in Edwards v. Snyder
152
 that a broad 
variety of medical conditions can amount to a serious medical need, 
“including a dislocated finger, a hernia, arthritis, heartburn and 
vomiting, a broken wrist, [or] minor burns from lying in vomit.”
153
 
Surely a brain tumor that causes numbness on one half of the body is 
at least as serious heartburn, vomiting, or a minor burn.  
Further, the majority stated that Rogers and Marberry were “not 
obliged to believe Miller’s assertion that he had a brain tumor and a 
lower-bunk pass” because prisoners often use manipulation and deceit 
to obtain advantages in prison.
154
 Even if Rogers and Marberry did not 
believe that Miller had a serious medical condition after his first few 
pleas for a lower-bunk, it seems unreasonable that they would still 
believe he was trying to manipulate them after his first fall from the 
upper-bunk. Could they reasonably believe that he was attempting to 
manipulate them after his second fall fractured his spine? A major 
problem with the majority’s opinion is that each fact from the case 
seems to have been examined in a vacuum. Each instance of Rogers or 
Marberry ignoring Miller’s pleas may not individually amount to a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment, but looking at the facts of the case 
as a whole established that Miller’s Eighth Amendment rights were 
violated.  
                                                 
150
 Id.  
151
 Id. at 428. 
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At the very least, Rogers and Marberry were deliberately 
indifferent to Miller’s serious medical condition. Deliberate 
indifference occurs when a prison official “realizes that a substantial 
risk of serious harm to a prisoner exists, but disregards it.”
155
 
Deliberate indifference can be found where a prison official knows 
about a constitutional violation and “turns a blind eye” to it.
156
 Rogers 
and Marberry both turned a blind eye to Miller’s substantial risk of 
serious harm by repeatedly ignoring his pleas.  
Because Rogers and Marberry knew about, or were deliberately 
indifferent to, Miller’s serious medical condition, Miller would have 
succeeded on an Eighth Amendment claim if he could have proved 
that they did not take minimally competent steps to deal with his 
condition.
157
 Neither Rogers nor Marberry took the minimally 
competent steps to assist Miller with his condition. In fact, neither of 
them took any steps to help him at all. The majority repeatedly brings 
up the fact that Miller should have complained to the guard who sat in 
an isolated pod and was responsible for bunk-assigning duties. 
Unfortunately, Miller only complained to Rogers and Marberry, who 
apparently were not capable of verifying Miller’s complaints or fixing 
the problem.
158
 But, would it have been that difficult for Rogers, who 
regularly roamed the halls of the prison, to ask the guard in the pod if 
Miller was telling the truth? Did Marberry, the warden of the prison, 
really not have the ability to verify if Miller was telling the truth? At 
the very least, Rogers or Marberry could have informed Miller of the 
proper person to bring his complaint to. Instead, Rogers and Marberry 
did nothing. They ignored Miller time after time. Rogers and Marberry 
did not have to fix the problem in its entirety; they only had to take 
minimally competent steps to fix the problem, which they failed to do. 
Rogers and Marberry both violated Miller’s Eighth Amendment rights 
when they acted with deliberate indifference to Miller’s serious 
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medical condition and failed to take the minimally competent steps to 
deal with that condition.   
 
2. The Majority Overextended Ashcroft v. Iqbal’s Holding 
 
 Next, the majority pointed to Ashcroft v. Iqbal
159
 to relieve Rogers 
and Marberry from liability because “liability under Bivens is personal 
rather than vicarious.”
160
 It is true that vicarious liability is 
inapplicable to Bivens,
161
 but the majority overextended the holding in 
Iqbal to absolve Rogers and Marberry of liability. In Iqbal, the 
Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a supervisor’s mere 
knowledge of a subordinate’s intent to discriminate amounts to the 
supervisor violating the Constitution.
162
 The Court in Iqbal made it 
clear that federal officials with supervisory authority “may not be held 
accountable for the misdeeds of their agents,” and that “purpose rather 
than knowledge is required to impose . . . liability . . . [on] an official 
charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent 
responsibilities.”
163
 In Miller, the majority failed to recognize that 
knowledge can impact an official’s duty: “A prison official’s 
knowledge of prison conditions learned from an inmate’s 
communications can, under some circumstances, constitute sufficient 
knowledge of the conditions to require the officer to exercise his or her 
authority and to take the needed action to investigate and, if necessary, 
to rectify the offending condition.”
164
 The majority failed to recognize 
that Marberry was not named as a defendant because her subordinate 
failed to assign Miller to the proper bunk; she was named as a 
defendant because she had sufficient knowledge of Miller’s condition 
to require her to exercise her authority and take some form of action.  
                                                 
159




 Id. at 676. 
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 Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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 In an attempt to bolster its theory of vicarious liability, the 
majority analogized Miller’s case to Burks v. Raemisch,
165
  where the 
Seventh Circuit held that prison officials do not become liable for 
rejecting prisoner’s grievances merely because the official fails to 
ensure an adequate remedy.
166
 However, in Burks, the prisoner brought 
a lawsuit against every prison official who knew or should have 
known about his medical condition, and also everyone higher up in the 
prison’s bureaucratic chain.
167
 The prisoner in Burks had named 
defendants that he had never even come into contact with.
168
 Miller’s 
case was different because he only named defendants who he had 
actually had contact with and were somehow involved in his plight.  
 The majority stated that Miller’s argument was deficient because 
it “suppose[d] that every federal employee is responsible, on pain of 
damages, for not implementing the decision of any other federal 
employee,”
169
 but this is not true. Miller was not seeking damages 
because a federal official did not implement the decision of another 
federal employee; Miller was seeking damages because Rogers and 
Marberry did absolutely nothing to assist him with his repeated 
requests to be placed in bed that was safe for him. As the court stated 
in Burkes: “Doing nothing could be simple negligence, but it does not 
stretch the imagination to see that it might also amount to deliberate 
indifference.”
170
 Ultimately, the majority rested its decision on the 
assertion that failing to enforce another federal official’s decision 
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3. Summary Judgment in Favor of the Defendants was Improper 
 
Lastly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants should not have been affirmed. Summary judgment is 
appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”
171
 A factual dispute is “material” if it might affect the 
outcome of the case.
172
 A material factual dispute is “genuine” if “a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
173
 
Lastly, on a motion for summary judgment, the facts must be 
presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
174
 When 
the facts are presented in the light most favorable to Miller, there are 
genuine disputes of material fact that would not entitle the defendants 
to judgment as a matter of law.  
The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants 
for two reasons. First, neither Rogers nor Marberry were responsible 
for bunk assignments.
175
 Second, if Rogers had consulted the prison’s 
SENTRY database, he would not have found a lower-bunk restriction 
in the database.
176
 The district court found it uncontested that Miller’s 
first lower-bunk restriction was not in the SENTRY database, and a 
new restriction was not issued until December 1, 2009.
177
 The district 
court relied on affidavits filed by Rogers and other guards stating that 
in January and February of 2009, Miller’s lower-bunk restriction was 
not recorded in the SENTRY database.
178
 However, this was directly 
contradicted by Warden Marberry, who confirmed in writing that 
Miller had received a lower-bunk restriction in January 2008, and the 
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restriction was recorded in the SENTRY database.
179
 This 
inconsistency was sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material 
fact that should have precluded summary judgment. This factual 
dispute is material because it might have affected the outcome of the 
case. Similarly, the dispute was genuine because a jury could have 
returned a verdict in favor of Miller. If there was a lower-bunk 
restriction recorded in the SENTRY database, and Rogers had 
completely ignored it, a jury could reasonably find that Rogers had 




The Seventh Circuit made several critical errors when it affirmed 
the decision of the lower court in Estate of Miller v. Marberry. The 
majority opinion ignored binding precedent, overextended the 
holdings of cited cases, and affirmed a grant of summary judgment 
when there were genuine disputes of material fact. In doing so, the 
Seventh Circuit has told prison officials that it is acceptable to ignore 
prisoners. The Seventh Circuit has told federal inmates that they have 
no remedy for harm caused to them by a federal official’s inaction and 
apathy.  The United States Supreme Court has stated that the purpose 
of the Bivens action is to deter federal officials from violating 
constitutional rights, but the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Estate of 
Miller v. Marberry deviates from the desired purpose. 
 
                                                 
179
 Id. at 431 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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